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ABSTRACT Focusing on recent debates over the ways in which subaltern groups engage with the
state in India, the article proposes that it is imperative to historicise our conceptions of subaltern
politics in India. More specifically, the argument is made that it is imperative to recognise that
subaltern appropriations of the institutions and discourses of the state have a longer historical
lineage than what is often proposed in critical work on popular resistance in rural India. The article
presents a detailed analysis of Adivasi rebellions in colonial western India and argues that these
took the form of a contentious negotiation of the incorporation of tribal communities into an
emergent “colonial state space.” The conclusion presents a sketch of a Gramscian approach to
the study of how subaltern politics proceeds in and through determinate state–society relations.
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“Everybody would say and think that the sarkar [“state” in Hindi] is the biggest among
us,” said Govindbhai, an activist with the Adivasi Mukti Sangathan (AMS) as he tried to
explain how the Bhil Adivasi communities of Barwani district in the western part of
Madhya Pradesh had experienced the local state.1 He continued, “They thought that the
hands of the sarkar were very big. Whatever the authorities say, that must be done. The
village had no status at all.”
The situation that Govindbhai described can be referred to as the “everyday tyranny” of
the local state (see Nilsen 2010). In western Madhya Pradesh, Bhil communities would
experience the state in the form of low-ranking officials – forest guards, police and
revenue officers (patwaris) in particular – who would demand bribes in cash and in
kind from villagers on various pretexts. The threat and actual use of force would always
accompany and underpin these demands. Commanding fear and deference among the
Bhils, the everyday tyranny of the local state in effect denied Adivasi communities in the
region even the most basic rights and entitlements, and thus entrenched the “adverse
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incorporation” (Hickey and du Toit 2007) of Bhil communities into the regional political
economy (see Nilsen 2012).
However, subordination and deprivation has not gone unchallenged in western Madhya
Pradesh. Govindbhai is one of many in his community who, during the 1990s, joined the
AMS to challenge the predations and violence of the local state (Nilsen 2012). Talking
about his experience of mobilisation, Govindbhai explained how people’s understanding
of the state had changed through their involvement with the AMS: “People would say that
the sarkar’s arm is big and long. It was later on that we realised that, in reality, the
sarkar’s arm is long because we are the ones who have voted and made the sarkar – then
we should also know what the law is, right? Later on, we realised that they are making
fools of us, so how is the sarkar’s arm long?”
This statement is significant, because it testifies to a fundamental transformation in the
way that the state is perceived by subaltern groups: from being viewed as an external
agency that could impose its power upon the village community at will, the state came to
be understood as an institution that derived its powers and its legitimacy from an active,
rights-bearing citizenry. This impact was driven by the awareness of rights and the
familiarity with bureaucratic procedures that the movement fostered among its activists
(Nilsen 2012). Indeed, the story of the AMS and its struggle against the everyday tyranny
of the state is one that can also be told about grassroots mobilisation throughout most of
the region that will be referred to in this article as the Bhil heartland – meaning south-
eastern Gujarat, southern Rajasthan, northeastern Maharashtra and western Madhya
Pradesh (see Nilsen 2012).
This article sets out to historicise these contemporary forms of claims-making through
an investigation of how Bhil communities have engaged state-making projects since the
end of the Anglo-Maratha wars in 1818. The point of doing so is to problematise a
particular aspect of the revised conception of subalternity that has emerged from
Chatterjee’s (2004, 2008) recent work. In the original Subaltern studies project, the state
tended to be posited as alien and irrelevant to the lifeworlds and oppositional projects of
poor rural Indians.2 One of the chief architects of the conceptual framework that under-
girded the Subaltern Studies project, Chatterjee (2008, 54) seems in his most recent
writings to have moved away from this perspective:
… the spread of governmental technologies in India in the last three decades, as a
result of the deepening reach of the developmental state under conditions of electoral
democracy, has meant that the state is no longer an external entity to the peasant
community.… Not only are peasants dependent on state agencies for these services,
they have also acquired considerable skill, albeit to a different degree in different
regions, in manipulating and pressurising these agencies to deliver these benefits.
Institutions of the state, or at least governmental agencies … have become internal
aspects of the peasant community.
Albeit wedded to Chatterjee’s problematic distinction between civil and political society,
this argument constitutes a significant departure from his earlier analysis of peasant
politics, in which the subaltern peasantry was seen as being pitted against a distant state
“which is not organic or integral to the familiar sphere of everyday social activity”
(Chatterjee 1982, 32).3
Subalterns and the State in the Longue Durée 575
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However, the analysis presented in this article suggests that it is historically and
analytically unsatisfactory and inaccurate to argue for such a simple distinction to be
made between “old” and “new” forms of peasant politics, where the former is charac-
terised by how “the concept of the community as a whole … shapes and directs peasant
politics vis-à-vis the state” (Chatterjee 1982, 35), while the latter proceeds through
negotiations with the governmental agencies of the state (see Chatterjee 2004).
Presenting an analysis of uprisings in the Bhil heartland from 1818 onwards, the article
argues that it is necessary to historicise in a much more thoroughgoing manner the ways
in which subaltern groups appropriate and manipulate the institutions and discourses of
the state. The investigation of these uprisings demonstrates that subversive appropriations
of state institutions and discourses were quite pervasive in the struggles that emerged to
defend extant dimensions of state–society relations that accommodated certain subaltern
needs and interests, and to challenge the adverse impacts that might flow from a
restructuring of a particular set of state–society relations in the Bhil heartland in the
colonial era.
This should not be equated with an argument that there exists an unbroken culture of
resistance in the Bhil heartland; to propose this would indeed amount to succumbing to
some of the most problematic tropes of the Subaltern Studies project (see O’Hanlon 1986;
Sivaramakrishnan 1995). What is being argued, though, is that at those moments when
opposition erupted in the region, it was rarely in the form of an all-out rejection of the
state or through a quest for the formation of what Scott (2010) has called a “non-state
space.” Rather, Bhil resistance tended to proceed through contentious negotiations of the
terms of incorporation into state–society relations. Two features typically characterised
these negotiations. One, the rebels would insist on the rightfulness of their resistance
through an appropriation of discourses and idioms that defined what was and what was
not a legitimate relationship between state and populace. Two, the insurgent Bhils pursued
their opposition to adverse incorporation in politico-administrative structures in a way
which suggests that they conceived of the state not as an entirely alien and external
Leviathan, but rather, in disaggregated terms, as an institution consisting of hierarchically
ordered echelons. These different echelons could be pitted against each other by turning to
one with an appeal for re-dressal of the wrongs perpetrated by another.4
This in turn signals the necessity of rethinking the dynamics of state–society relations
in the context of subaltern politics. This article will seek to contribute to this rethinking in
the following way. The next section presents a thumbnail sketch of how sovereignty was
structured in the Bhil heartland in the pre-colonial era and how this structuration was
altered by and through the coming of colonial rule in the nineteenth century. The article
then moves on to discuss the characteristics of Bhil rebellions from 1818 to the early
1920s, looking in particular at how insurgent Adivasis justified the act of rebellion
through critiques of the workings of the state. Drawing on this analysis, the final section
outlines a Gramscian perspective that can underpin the study of state–society relations and
subaltern politics across the macro-structural terrain of the longue durée as well as in the
contemporary dynamics of quotidian engagements with state power.
From Shared Sovereignty to Colonial State Space
Constraints of space rule out an in-depth examination of the relationships that existed
between Bhils, Rajputs and Marathas in western India during the pre-colonial era.
576 A. G. Nilsen
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However, a narrative in which the Bhils are represented as subaltern autocthons living
beyond the reach of the tributary states of the Rajputs and Marathas would be a deeply
flawed one. Rather, Bhil chiefdoms were in fact “deeply integrated into the political
economy of medieval India” (Guha 1999, 121). The terms of Bhil integration into the
tributary states in the region were expressed in the fact that Bhil chieftains would make
claims to dues – known as haks or giras haks – from peasant villages in the plains (Skaria
1999). These claims were recognised as legitimate by Rajput and Maratha rulers, and in
those cases when Bhils descended upon the plains to raid, this was interpreted by these
rulers as a sign that it would be necessary to renegotiate Bhil claims on the villages within
their realm. Skaria (1998: 208) thus suggests that the relationship between Bhil forest
polities and Hindu tributary states were structured as a form of “shared sovereignty.”
Shared sovereignty, in turn, should be understood as a foundational principle of the
structuring of political power in tributary states. Tributary states were based on forms of
surplus appropriation in which monarchical rulers were fundamentally dependent on a
network of aristocratic fief-holders and landlords. Consequently, they were also faced
with what Haldon (1993, 156) has referred to as “the tributary constraint” – that is, the
centripetal dynamics animated by the ruling elites that actually appropriated surplus
from the peasantry. Governing a tributary state therefore came to revolve around
attempts to “manage the ebb and flow of this internal tension that was part and parcel
of historical dynamics of all traditional agrarian, subject-peasant … societies” (Berktay
1991, 260). The relevance of this in terms of understanding state–society relations and
subaltern politics in the Bhil heartland is the following: the coming of the Raj did not
entail the emergence of a relationship between tribal autocthons and a state-making
project where earlier there had been no such relationship. Rather, colonial rule intro-
duced a new form of state-making that changed the terms of Bhil integration into the
regional political economy of western India.
The making of what Goswami (2004) has called “colonial state space” in the Bhil
heartland restructured the workings of sovereignty through strategies designed to bring
about a transformation of the region’s economic geography and through the introduction
of new modalities of state power. In terms of economic geography, two intertwined
processes transformed the region: the promotion of settled agriculture from the 1820s to
the 1860s, and the steady advance of forest enclosures from the 1860s until the end of
the century (see Guha 1999; Whitehead 2012). Sedentarisation was a failure: instead of
transforming the Bhils into a prosperous, tax-paying peasantry, the policy yielded
extreme dependency on usurious moneylenders and, in some cases, widespread land
alienation (see Hardiman 1996). Forest enclosures compounded the impacts of this
process by restricting access to a pivotal resource base, and the combined effect of
these processes were to give rise to the marginal subsistence peasantry that today
scrambles for survival in western India’s informal economy (see Breman 1996; Guha
1999).
The extension of political authority in the Bhil heartland started in the early 1820s in
Khandesh, when military force was used to “pacify” rebellious tribal communities that
mobilised to protest the curtailment of their giras haks. In the wake of military pacifica-
tion, the former insurgents were settled as peasant cultivators. The colonial rulers offered a
pardon on the condition that the chieftains would not challenge British supremacy in the
future. The claims to haks were investigated, settled and paid to the Bhil chiefs as
“colonial pensions” (Guha 1999, 141). Pacification and settlement was gradually extended
Subalterns and the State in the Longue Durée 577
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from Khandesh (northeastern Maharashtra) to the Anglo-Sisodia regime in Mewar (south-
ern Rajasthan), to the Dangs (southeastern Gujarat), and ultimately also to the princely
states of Nimad (western Madhya Pradesh). Concerted efforts were then made to develop
the governmental capacities of the state in relation to Bhil subjects – especially in terms of
its fiscal and coercive powers. And through this process, the ensemble of institutions
through which everyday tyranny would be enacted in the post-colonial era came into
being. In sum, from 1818 onwards, a new state–society relation was crafted in which Bhil
communities were incorporated as the subordinates of a state apparatus whose sovereignty
was constructed in singular terms, whose governmental capacities were vastly augmented
compared to its tributary predecessors, and whose machinations – embodied in the daily
interactions between its personnel and subaltern communities – were coercive and pre-
datory. However, this process of change did not proceed without challenge.
Mapping “the Rebellious Century” in the Bhil Heartland
Bhil resistance in Khandesh
The British finally vanquished Maratha opposition to the expansion of their rule in 1818.
At this point, the Bhil communities in the region were engaged in widespread raiding of
the caste Hindu villages in the plains. According to the new colonial overlords, this was a
result of the fact that persistent warfare and famine had disrupted the regular payment of
tribute to the Bhil chieftains.
Previously the Bhils “had … lived with the other inhabitants, and had, as village
watchmen, been the great instruments of police …” (Khandesh Gazetteer 1880, 254).
With the disruption that unfolded in the two first decades of the nineteenth century, such
co-existence was rendered impossible, and the erstwhile watchmen took to raiding to
sustain themselves (see, for example, Simcox 1912). According to Graham (1856, 210)
the raids were so extensive that:
villages in every direction were plundered and murders daily committed; cattle and
hostages were driven off from the very centre of the province; and the excesses rose
to such a height that the Ryuts [farmers] refused to receive Tukavee [loans given to
peasants] whilst their property was thus utterly insecure.
In this context, the British effort was very much centred on pacification as a pre-condition
for establishing the undisputed authority of Company Raj throughout Khandesh.
Mountstuart Elphinstone – at this point in time Deccan Commissioner – ordered John
Briggs, the first Political Agent in Khandesh to make “overtures … to the chiefs about
well-founded claims … and to satisfy those claims as soon as possible ….” Whereas
Elphinstone was clear that “it will be necessary to make examples of some of [the Bhil
chiefs]” if they failed to collaborate with the British initiative, he was clear that military
action should be a last resort and that “no pain should be spared to keep the Bheels quiet
and prevent their annoying us, or aiding our enemies” (cited in Prasad 1991, 122).
Under Briggs’ leadership, troops were divided into small detachments and sent into
the hills to obstruct the Bhils’ supply lines (see Briggs 1885, 77). “These measures,”
wrote Elphinstone, “soon reduced the Bheels to accept the very favourable terms held
out to them, the chiefs receiving pensions and allowances for a certain number of men,
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and binding themselves to restrain the depredations of their people.” (cited in Briggs
1885, 77). However, it was also in the context of this process of pacification that the
first rounds of contentious negotiations between the Bhils and the nascent colonial
regime took place.
Gumani Naik of Sendhwa ghat (mountain pass) was the first chieftain that Briggs
reached a settlement with, and his interactions with the colonial authorities in
Khandesh provide us with an example of the dynamics of these negotiations. On
March 5, 1818, an agreement was reached in which Gumani agreed to refrain from
raids and attacks on villages in Thalner district. He also agreed to help the colonial
authorities in the further settlement of the region. Gumani controlled the area around
the Sendhwa pass – a crucial gateway for trade between Malwa and Khandesh – and
before the coming of the British he had collected taxes for the Holkars. A portion of
the money derived from this had accrued to him. Upon entering into an agreement
with the British, he vowed to not attack or otherwise harass those who travelled
through the pass. Customs duties were to be collected by the Government Customs
House, which was established in Sendhwa ghat. The customs master would then pay
Gumani’s share to him. The chieftain’s duties were restricted to ensuring safe passage
and informing colonial authorities of disquiet and unrest among other Bhil groups.
The British on their part agreed to pay Gumani “all those Huks which are proved by
the records of the Mahal to have been customary …,” which all in all amounted to an
annual sum of 2,000 rupees (Briggs cited in Deshpande 1987, 86).
This agreement, however, did not pacify Gumani. On four separate occasions between
October 1818 and January 1819 he violated the terms of the settlement by engaging in
raiding, collecting tolls from travellers and finally lifting cattle from the village of
Chopda. When questioned about these actions, Gumani argued that the Bhils had resorted
to stealing cattle as the Scindia’s officials at Chopda had refused to pay his haks. The
mamlatdar (village official) at Chopda was instructed by Briggs to pay Gumani what he
was owed, and his status was also upgraded, as he was allowed to maintain troops. His
pension, however, was reduced to 1,200 rupees annually (Deshpande 1987: 86–88).
It may be tempting to see Gumani’s infractions of the agreement he had reached with
Briggs as rejections of the British attempt to reorganise sovereignty in the area. This,
however, is not a tenable proposition. According to Gumani, he did not violate the terms
of the agreement with the British in order to protest the terms of his settlement as such, or
to protest his subordination to colonial authority as such. Rather, he engaged in raiding
and stole cattle because the minions of the Scindias had not honoured the terms of that
settlement. That his discontent should take the form of raiding and cattle-theft is only
logical given that this was an established way of claiming dues that had not been paid in
the pre-colonial era. As Skaria (1999, 131, 135) puts it, raids were not “ends in them-
selves” geared towards securing subsistence, but rather a way in which to sustain “claims
to giras and through it political power and sovereignty.” And Gumani Naik was not the
only Khandesh chieftain to resort to such measures when the terms of the new agreements
with the British were violated.
For example, in May 1818, the British sought to settle the claims of the Satmala,
Satkunda and Kaldwary Bhils. Their haks were settled at 648 rupees per annum, and the
raiding ceased for some time. However, in late January 1819, Cheel Naik, one of their
leaders, rebelled and attacked and plundered the village of Dharangaon. In an exchange
with British authorities, he pointed out that out of the 648 rupees that had been promised
Subalterns and the State in the Longue Durée 579
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to him and his followers, only 175 rupees had been received. He proceeded to justify his
revolt as follows:
It is necessary to let you know that you have not performed your engagement, on which
account we attacked the village. If you will now provide for us, we will refrain from
plundering. Is it right for you to desire us not to plunder and yet make no provisions for
us? First cause to be paid to us our just claims and then call us to account for any
robberies committed by us. Do as you please, but to give us nothing to eat and leave us
to feed on leaves and grass is an admirable plan – we are Sirdars [military officers].
What occasion is there for us to write more? (Prasad 1991, 148–149)
Briggs did not acknowledge these claims, and ordered the military to hunt down and
capture Cheel Naik. Eventually he surrendered, and was executed in early June 1819
(Deshpande 1987: 104).
Yet another example can be found in the trajectory of Kaniya Naik, a chieftain in the
easternmost part of the Satpura range. Kaniya was a chief of some substance, who in 1818
had some 650 men – both Bhils and Sibandis5 – under his command. Like many of the
other Satpura chieftains, he settled with the British after being subjected to a military
campaign, and was paid haks in exchange for police services. However, when the
payments of his haks stopped, Kaniya took to raiding. When questioned by Briggs as
to the reasons for his actions, he responded as follows:
My situation is thus: There are 5000 men under me and their ancestors for genera-
tions have subsisted by plunder. You are now the Masters of the Country and
thousands look to you for protection and support. If by your means I and my
followers are provided with subsistence, we will abstain from plundering (cited in
Deshpande 1987, 91).
Briggs instructed his officers in the area to settle Kaniya’s claims. Kaniya, however,
refused to take the offers from the British seriously, and instead joined forces with other
chieftains in the region and carried on raiding. At this point, Briggs was convinced that
negotiations were no longer adequate in relation to the Bhils: “It is towards their extirpa-
tion,” he wrote to one of his officers in late January 1819, “that we should direct our first
attention” (cited in Prasad 1991, 137). Further military campaigns were pursued against
the Bhils of the Satpuras, and eventually, in March 1819, Kaniya surrendered to the
British. In order to secure his allegiance to colonial authorities, he was given a personal
grant of 600 rupees per year, as well as 620 bighas of land (Prasad 1991, 137).
When Briggs left Khandesh in 1823, the province was still “harassed and unsafe”
(Khandesh Gazetteer 1880, 253) and the Bhils rose frequently against the colonial
authorities.6 However, what is interesting in this process from the point of view of under-
standing the dynamic of state–society relations in subaltern politics is the way in which Bhil
chieftains such as Gumani Naik, Cheel Naik and Kaniya Naik justify their rebellions: in
their exchanges with the British, the theme is not so much that of rejecting the colonial state
and vindicating an autochthonous existence, but rather a claim for certain rights and
prerogatives to be respected within a determinate constellation of state power and sover-
eignty. And in these contentious negotiations, the notion that acquiescence was dependent
on rightful subsistence seems to have been particularly significant: “It is better to eat and
580 A. G. Nilsen
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die,” claimed a group of Bhils who rebelled against the non-payment of haks, “than die
without food” (cited in Deshpande 1987, 105). This, as we shall see, was also a foundational
theme when the Bhils of Mewar and Nimad rose in rebellion.
Bhil resistance in Mewar
In pre-colonial Mewar, the polities of the Bhils had been integrated in the political
economy of Rajput kingdoms in such a way that the latter were compelled to recognise,
to some extent, the power and sovereignty of the former (see Kapur 2002). This, however,
came to change quite profoundly from 1818 onwards, with the coming of British para-
mountcy (see Rudolph and Rudolph 1966).
In the 1830s, the British increased their military presence in Mewar in order to be better
able to quell unrest among the Bhils. Efforts were also made to fortify the policing
capacities of the Sisodia regime that ruled the state. The Maharana in Udaipur considered
this as an opportunity to increase the amount of revenue extracted from the Bhils (Sen
2003). This move provoked a wave of raiding and rebellion from 1835 to 1841.
Commenting on the outbreak of raiding and a series of attacks on police outposts in
1839, a British colonel observed that the disquiet in the region was “solely attributable to
injudicious taxation” (Brookes 1859, 85). What is interesting about this conflict is the way
in which its character gradually changed following military operations in 1841: “By the
middle of the century, Bhil villages were petitioning British officers against oppression at
the hands of the durbar’s officials” (Sen 2003, 281; emphasis added).
Thus, in 1856 the Bhil villages of Peepli and Paduna submitted a petition to the
political agent in Mewar, complaining about unjust levies being charged by the
Maharana’s durbar (royal court). In the case of Paduna village, they argued that they
had, in the 1840s, been assessed for an annual plough tax of 80 rupees per year. However,
after the village had been resumed into khalsa (state land), the Mewar court levied an
annual plough tax of 50 rupees and a koot levy (a share of the grain collected from the
threshing floors after harvest). The attempt by the Sisodia regime to tighten its fiscal grip
around the Bhil communities has to be understood in terms of the impact of the British
presence: from the Maharana’s point of view, the increased military presence made it
possible to levy taxes more easily. Indeed, in 1850, Paduna was attacked by the
Maharana’s troops as a result of the village not having paid its taxes; all the cattle were
seized and a heavy fine imposed on the village. The petition from the village of Peepli
told a very similar story: during the 1820s, the petition stated, they paid 52 rupees as an
annual plough tax. However, in the 1840s, the tax burden increased with the imposition of
a fauj barar (a tax towards the funding of military troops) that was levied twice under the
name of Tirsala. According to the villagers of Peepli, they could not afford to pay the 200
rupees every second year in addition to the annual plough tax (Sen 2003, 281–282). In
this context, a colonial official wrote: “A constant struggle has been going on between the
native authorities seeking to oppress the Bhils and the British superintendent to protect
them” (Brookes 1859, 88).
These events are best understood as manifestations of a general tendency in the Bhil
heartland, in which British support for princely rulers and the insistence upon singular
sovereignty with sharply defined territorial boundaries pushed towards a consolidation of
monarchical power in the princely states: “By the late nineteenth century, the Bhil chiefs
had been almost completely subordinated, their political power had been marginalised,
Subalterns and the State in the Longue Durée 581
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and each little king possessed a far more uncontested authority over his ‘kingdom’ than
had been the case previously” (Skaria 1999, 174).
What is so compelling is that the forms of Adivasi resistance and assertion that
developed in this era took the form of a contentious negotiation over the terms of
integration in the polity, rather than the outright rejection of colonial state space. In
contesting the increasingly adverse terms upon which they were incorporated in the
Mewar polity, the Bhils sought to defend past arrangements and the compromises that
had been reached between forest polities and tributary rulers. Moreover, they did this on
the basis of a moral economy that attached to this relation, within which there was a
degree of mutual recognition of power and sovereignty, as well as of the legitimate
prerogatives of the different parties. When this moral economy was sundered by a
monarchical order bolstered by augmented military powers, resistance erupted. Initially,
this resistance took the form of the raid – the customary way in which Bhils would
enforce their haks – but, in the aftermath of armed reprisals and the further extension of
military and political power, petitioning comes to the forefront as a strategy for assertion.
This is significant as it suggests a readiness to engage the emergent new state apparatus in
a way that is acknowledged as legitimate and, furthermore, an expectation that the upper
echelons of this apparatus may find subaltern grievances to be reasonable.
This does not mean, however, that the era of insurrection was over. When the
British first arrived in Mewar, one of their key objectives was to put an end to Bhils
claiming taxes and levies from merchant travellers on the Udaipur–Ahmedabad road.
This right to collect such taxes had been one of the most important prerogatives of the
Bhils in pre-colonial Mewar, and attempts to abolish it had provoked a series of
revolts during the 1820s (Sen 2003). These taxes and levies remained a contentious
issue throughout the following decades, and in 1881, the erosion of the material and
symbolic significance of this prerogative combined with anger over the introduction of
new levies and taxes, harassment of Bhil communities by local officials, the extraction
of begar (forced labour), and the rapaciousness of moneylenders to ignite a major
rebellion (Mathur 1988; Sen 2000).
After a clash between Bhils from the village of Paduna and representatives of the
Udaipur court in March 1881, a large group of Bhils gathered together, marched to the
nearest thana (police outpost) and attacked it. The thanedars (police officers), five sowars
(soldiers), and 16 others were killed and their bodies mutilated. The thana was burned
along with all the baniya shops in Bara village. Bhils from the nearby area joined the revolt
and a series of armed encounters took place between them and the troops of the Maharana,
as well as British troops, leaving more than 70 Bhils dead (Mathur 1988; Sen 2000).
Interestingly, during the 1881 rebellion, the Bhils made several demands for conces-
sions from the Maharana, but at the same time, they changed the tenor of their critique of
the state. Previously, they had appealed to the British to relieve them of the unfair taxes
imposed upon them by the princely rulers. Now, however, their ire had turned from the
Sisodia rulers towards the British. Thus, a British military commander was told to his
face: “… you are from Delhi, go away. The Maharana is our sovereign; the officers sent
by him have come and we will talk only with them” (cited in Sen 2000, 89). Still, the
statement reflects a recognition rather than a rejection of royal authority and the Udaipur
court – and a key objective still seems to be to negotiate a reclaiming of the prerogatives
and privileges that had been undermined by the confluence of princely and colonial
strategies. To a certain extent, the Bhils were successful in this, as some concessions
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were granted by the Udaipur court (Sen 2000, 92–93). A British colonial official com-
plained bitterly that “[t]he Bhils have succeeded in extorting by fire and murder unreason-
able concessions and this is sure to have the most mischievous effect, although it may
ensure a temporary truce” (cited in Singh 1995, 49).
Bhil resistance in Nimad
The Bhil chieftains of Alirajpur and Badwani went through a similar process of establish-
ing settlements that would underpin pacification in the princely states from as early as
1818. In the early stages of this process, the British were more than happy to use military
force against those chieftains who failed to honour these agreements. Local Rajput rulers
were keen to use this to their advantage as they sought to squash Bhil claims to dues and
stipends from the courts (Kela 2012, 105–120).
In Badwani state, on the southern side of the Narmada, military pacification and
settlement picked up momentum from 1833 onwards. Here, resident colonial officials
were keenly aware that it was necessary to guarantee “the Bheel Naicks of this district the
regular payment of their acknowledged dues from the Burwanee Rajah and by holding an
even balance between them to prevent oppression on the one hand and to secure
obedience on the other” (cited in Kela 2012, 130). Such sentiments, however, had little
impact: in the late 1830s, the payment of haks to the Bhils was still in arrears, and raiding
continued. Until the early 1840s, the colonial strategy centred on military reprisals against
raiders. A more conciliatory approach was adopted from the middle of the 1840s. Leading
British officials toured the Badwani hills on an annual basis, and an investigation into the
claims of the chieftains was carried out. However, as long as Bhil raiding was subject to
military reprisals, there was very little incentive for Rajput rulers to comply with the
settlements that had been reached (Kela 2012, 130–136). The grievances that were thus
generated would give rise to two major rebellions in Nimad during the second half of the
nineteenth century – first in Badwani and then in Alirajpur.
The first rebellion was headed by Bhima Naik. Deemed by the British to be “one of the
most respectable and civilised” chieftains that they had dealings with, a series of circum-
stances and events had coalesced to push him towards insurgency from 1853 onwards,
and in 1857 itself, Nimad became restive as the Great Uprising erupted in North India
(Kela 2012, 143–144). In August 1857 Bhima and another chieftain, Mavasiya, gathered
between 800 and 900 Bhils, and was joined by Khajia Naik, the rakhwaldar (road
watchman) of the Sendhwa road. By August and September it was reported that
“Bhima Naik of Burwani Ilaqa” had attacked and plundered villages and caused “great
depredations” across Nimad (cited in Singh 1998, 83).
Bhima’s raiding would expand over the coming months. The moral economy that
animated the raiding becomes evident in statements such as the following:
I do not go to plunder Mauza Datware of my own accord, as you suspect. I was
ordered by Maharaja Jaswant Singh, the Raja of Barwani, Bhoodhgeer Bawa and
Dowlatsingh Mama that I should go and plunder the country within my reach, except
Barwani, and was further directed that I should take possession of and plunder
Mauza Datware because he said the village belonged to Barwani. Fifty rupees and
a dress of honour were then given to me with instructions to perform the required
services. But the Raja did not afterwards support me in the undertaking, and
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therefore, I have now determined to make aggressions upon his own territories (cited
in Singh 1998, 83).
What emerges from these statements is not so much a declaration of distance from the
state; rather, Bhima is highlighting his closeness to the princely ruler – he has been the
servant of the Raja of Badwani and has acted on his orders – as well as his dismay that
this ruler has betrayed him. In a letter in which Bhima addressed an attack on the village
of Datwada, the failure to honour his rightful claims to haks is emphasised as the reason
for actions: “… we plundered the village of Dutwada because we have not received our
Huks due from the Sirkar [state government] Holkar since the arrival of the British here.
But we will not be satisfied until we plunder some other villages in other elakas” (cited in
Kela 2012, 150).
These statements express a theme that would run throughout Bhima’s communications
with the British during his uprising: it was not so much an encroaching state that he
objected to as a state that had failed to honour the terms of an agreement. For example, in
a letter to the Raja of Barwani, he wrote:
Baboo Hunner Lall has not yet made any arrangements for our pay and very likely he
will go away after realizing the money without making arrangements for us. We
therefore advise you to detain him until he does something for us. If the Baboo has a
mind to fight with us let him come, but don’t you join with him as you are our
master.… We will do for the Europeans and their servants as Holkar and the King of
Delhi will direct us and see how does the Baboo go safe (cited in Kela 2012, 148).
According to Shashank Kela (2012, 148) Babu Hunner Lall is most probably a merchant
or tax farmer who has been mandated by then Raja to negotiate with the naiks. The terms
of whatever agreement might have been reached between him and the chieftains have
been breached, Bhil insurgents have been captured, and their supplies have been inter-
cepted or blocked. In this missive, the intent is to overthrow the British, but the over-
lordship of the princely ruler, to whom the rebels appeal for support, is equally clearly
stated – “you are our master.”
The next communiqué from Bhima and his followers, however, was less indulgent
toward the Rajput ruler:
We have written to you before about the capture of our sepoys and provisions. You
capture the men who bring us Rasud. Very well, we will take prisoners all the sepoys
[soldiers] of Burwani and other thanas in Sirkar elaka. Take care, we have received
orders from the King of Delhi to cut off the heads of Europeans and those in their
employ, with assurances that success will reach us after Dushera (cited in Kela
2012, 149).
As Kela points out, the stipends of the Bhil chiefs had been held back for a long period of
time; the Raja of Barwani had promised to pay, but then reneged. He pleaded with the
colonial authorities to “arrange that some forces might be sent against these Bheels from
Candeish.” The rebellion, however, was hard to kill and the conflict rolled on for several
years. Bhima carried out his last raid during the monsoon of 1861, and remained on the
run until 1868 (cited in Kela 2012: 150, 155–166).
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During Bhima’s trial, the narrative of princely betrayal as a justification for revolt
re-emerged. His brother Sewa argued that their rebellion was triggered by deprivation:
“We began to be in want and could get nothing to eat so we went and plundered
Kantool … we went again for grain, being in a state of starvation … after some 20
days we plundered Datwada and returned to Dhaba Bowree” (cited in Kela 2012,
168). Bhima confirmed much of his brother’s testimony, but also stressed the loss of
rightful claims by pointing out how he had rebelled because his village had been taken
from him:
When the Mutiny broke out I heard nothing of it. The Rana of Burwanee summoned
me and told me to bring Mowassia with me and one or two hundred men. I collected
[them] … [but] went alone to the Rana and said to him that I would assist the sirkar if
my inamee [revenue] villages which had been taken for granted were restored. The
Rana said this could not be done at present and I went into rebellion and plundered
all the grain in the village of Bulkoa and went into the hills. All our supplies were
stopped and I sent a message to the Rana that our men must have something to eat or
else they would plunder. The Rana said that he could do nothing, so we began to
plunder but only took the necessaries – food, clothes, cooking utensils and such like
things (cited in Kela 2012, 169).
He added: “Of course we plundered wayfarers, but we were obliged to do that for our
subsistence” (cited in Kela 2012, 170).
Between 1820 and the 1880s, the princely state of Alirajpur, located north of the
Narmada river, had been considerably transformed by colonial reform efforts geared
towards consolidating state finance and fiscal capacities: collective village assessment
were replaced by plough taxes, which were more onerous; patwaris were employed to fix
individual assessments; forest use was heavily taxed; distillation of Mahua (liquour) was
regulated. In 1883, 12 patels (village headmen) from the parganas (local administrative
units) of Rath and Takarbara submitted a list of complaints to the Political Agent in
Alirajpur: “The late Maharana … treated us very kindly. The land revenue was assessed in
lump for each village according to the means of cultivation. Each cultivator had to pay
rupees 3 or 4 per plough, and consequently the patels as well as the cultivators were
satisfied” (Kela 2012, 208). In addition to complaining about the new system of taxation,
the Bhils also pointed out that the traders had started using a weighing system that was
disadvantageous to the cultivators, that pateli haks (dues of the village headman) had not
been paid, that the new abkari (excise) system and the taxes on sale of timber and minor
forest produce was inimical to them, and that the moneylenders in the area harassed and
exploited them. These complaints were not new; according to Kela (2012: 209–210) a
formal petition against the new land assessment system had been forwarded to the
Political Agent as early as 1869. Several other petitions were submitted in the following
years, and, subsequent to a series of raids in the early 1870s, a handful of chieftains won
some minor concessions.
Bad agricultural years followed one upon the other from 1877 onwards, but the
Alirajpur court granted no remissions to its peasant cultivators. Again rebellion erupted,
and again Chitu Patel was at the forefront; this time he was joined by Makranis (Baluchi
mercenaries). On 7 January 1883, a crowd of Bhils and Makranis with Chitu at the helm
looted the town of Nanpur. Chaktala was the next village to fall prey to the rebellion,
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followed by Bhabra, a market village between Alirajpur and Jhabua. Crucially, the
rebellion was first and foremost aimed at traders and state functionaries (Kela 2012,
214). Some three to five thousand Bhils and makranis encircled Alirajpur a few days after
the attack on Bhabra. The rebels laid siege to the treasury and presented their key demand,
namely that British superintendence should be abolished and the king’s rule restored:
“Events had coalesced popular feeling around the king’s person” (cited in Kela 2012,
214). He had thus come to represent the pre-1869 revenue system, which was marked to a
far greater extent by the prerogatives of shared sovereignty.
The siege developed into a stalemate. The former king’s mother approached the Bhils to
hear their grievances. Whereas her account may well reflect the bias of the class of
princely rulers, it confirms the theme of restoration of past arrangements and prerogatives
as being at the heart of the Bhil rebellion. Chitu Patel complained that his haks had been
withdrawn, and asked for the restoration of the king, whom, he said “ought to live in
Rajpur, so that his subjects may always pay their respects … and get consolation at his
hands” (cited in Kela 2012, 216). The rebels also complained that the patwaris carried out
assessments “at full rates, without considering that the cultivators have suffered by the
death of their bullocks, and that the number of their ploughs have been reduced to half
what they were in former years” (cited in Kela 2012, 216). Moreover, the avaricious
Dewan (chief minister) was a key target of Bhil grievances: “Let another Dewan be
appointed,” the Bhils argued, “and then our grievances will be heard by him, but we don’t
want these dewans and patwaris” (cited in Kela 2012, 216). This demand was reiterated
throughout the course of the rebellion, until Chitu ultimately surrendered under pressure
from the Malwa Bhil Corps. During his trial he claimed that he and his men had been
“driven to desperation by … maladministration” and were forced to rebel in order to call
attention to their plight (cited in Kela 2012, 219). Ultimately, the rebellion yielded fewer
dividends than the Mewar uprising of 1881, and colonial state space would only become
more entrenched and consolidated over the course of the next six decades.
Between 1818 and 1880 the Bhil heartland underwent a substantial transformation as
the economic geography of the region was moulded according to colonial imperatives and
the modalities of state power were reconfigured in ways that entrenched a singular form of
sovereignty. If one were to deploy the analytical optic of the Subaltern Studies project,
one would expect that tribal resistance in this context would gravitate around a vindication
of “the peasant-communal mode of power” in opposition to the coming of the colonial
behemoth (Chatterjee 1983). This, however, is not what the historical record reveals.
Rather, what seems to be the case is that the chieftains of the Bhil forest polities spear-
headed forms of collective action in which the principal impulse was not so much a
wholesale repudiation of the new modalities of state power as an attempt to carve put as
advantageous as possible a position with the emergent colonial state space.
Significantly, Bhil chieftains seemed quite ready to accept the initial terms of settlement
in the wake of military pacification. When rebellions erupted they were not so much
centred on or articulated as a rejection of these settlements tout court as a protest against
violations of the terms of the settlement. In this sense, one could argue that the Bhils
sought to negotiate the terms of their incorporation into colonial state space on the basis of
a moral economy that accepted the presence of the state, but protested against some of its
workings. Moreover, in pursuing their protests, the Bhils actively appealed to different
strata of the state, very often in the hope that echelons perceived to be located at a higher
scale in the hierarchy of political power might intervene on their behalf against the
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wrongdoings of lower echelons. In this sense, Skaria’s argument that Bhil resistance in
nineteenth century Dangs was not a form of anti-state insurgency, but rather a form of
conflictual encounter in which “power was being negotiated, even if this took place in
contexts where the forest chiefs were aware of the balance being skewed against them”
can be generalised to apply to the Bhil heartland as a region. He proceeds: “In later
decades, the power of the sarkar [state] could be invoked … In this, it was to be
appropriated as an ally … Thus the shared fear of the sarkar did not necessarily translate
into shared hostility” (Skaria 1999, 273). However, Skaria overstates his case when he
goes on to argue that the early twentieth century witnessed a change in which wholesale
insurgency against the state “in the name of Bhil Raj became possible, and even desir-
able” (Skaria 1999, 274). As I will show in the following discussion of Bhil resistance in
the Rajputana Agency from 1910 to the early 1920s, the notion of Bhil Raj (Bhil rule)
emerged as a key idiom of resistance, but this did not entail a renunciation of negotiation
with state-making projects.
Bhil resistance in the Rajputana Agency
Dungarpur state was to be the site of the next major upheaval in the Bhil heartland. Here,
from 1911 onwards, the Bhils rallied under the leadership of Govind Giri, a Banjara
(nomadic caste) who in the wake of having lost his family and his livelihood to the famine
of 1899–1900, dedicated his life to preaching social reform among the tribals.7
Govind Giri called upon the Bhils to behave like sahukars (moneylenders) – that is, to
adopt the ways and mores of the upper castes – and, drawing on the ritual practices of the
Shaivite sect Dasnami Panth, encouraged his followers to tend the dhuni (fire pits) and
hoist the nishan (flags) outside their houses: “In this way,” Govind Giri delared, “I
preached them the path of truth” (cited in Hardiman 2003, 261–262). The injunctions
were drawn from Bhagat movements that had been active throughout the area: “Moral
self-reform along such lines provided a potent means for a legitimate and effective form of
assertion within the new political order” (cited in Hardiman 2003, 264).
However, Govind Giri’s preaching soon took a radical turn as he developed a strong
critique of hierarchy and exploitation. In his sermons he would tell the Bhils that they
were in no way inferior to any other community, and that their destitution was caused by
the exactions of the Rajas (princely rulers) and the Thakurs (landlords). The Bhils, Govind
Giri explained, were the rightful owners of the land, and therefore they also had the right
to rule over it. He propagated the coming of a Bhil Raj in the hills of Sunth and Banswara
states, in which the Bhil kingdom that existed eight hundred years back would be restored.
Colonial authorities were quick to label Govind Giri and his followers as a “disloyal
and anarchical movement” as they continued to make headway in the princely states (cited
in Singh 1995, 95). In October 1913, the political agent of southern Rajputana sent word
to his counterpart in Rewakantha, ordering the arrest of Govind Giri. A search began,
provoking a series of clashes between the Bhils and police forces. As the persecution of
his movement continued, Govind Giri assembled his followers on Mangarh hill, which is
situated between the states of Sunth and Banswara. A large police force was assembled
within a few days, and was soon joined by military reinforcements. The messages that
were sent from Govind Giri to the police and the representatives of the colonial authorities
during the standoff allow us a glimpse into the movement’s rationale. First of all, Govind
Giri expressed a strong critique of the dominant social groups in the region:
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The Hindus and Muhammadans have forsaken their religions. Hindus have become
atheists. Rajputs have destroyed our worship, and forced us to eat flesh and drink.
Muhammadans force us to eat beef and destroy our religion. For all these reasons we
have gone to the hills as we are helpless. Rajputs are so cruel that they kill their girls
so that they may not give in marriage to others. In the same way they have been so
cruel towards the Bhils that they beat them without enquiry whether they are right or
wrong. The Rajputs do not allow their young widows to re-marry and if these girls
become widows in young age the sin of infant widowhood is on their head because
they remain unhappy in that life and are miserable. The Sarkar is also to blame for
this shortcoming. No true Brahmin is seen.… These three castes dare not come to us.
The Muhammadans are infidels and take interest on money and eat boar’s flesh
which is prohibited in their religion. These people who are infidels destroy our
worship. They do not like a religion which preaches good morality (cited in
Hardiman 2003, 266).
As Hardiman points out, Govind’s attack on the Rajputs was expressive of widespread
disgust in the region at the workings of Rajput hierarchy, and in this way Govind
“combined his attack on Rajput political power with a critique of the treatment of
Rajput women” (cited in Hardiman 2003, 267). His admonishment of “the
Muhammadans” reflected a popular dislike of the fact that Muslims – commonly
known as “Sindhis” – staffed the state police and Thakur militias; some were also
known to be particularly predatory moneylenders. Similarly, the Brahmins are taken to
task for failing their role as righteous servants of the state. Overall, his is an argument that
portrays the moral corruption of the princely regime, and contrasts this to the moral
rectitude of his movement – a moral rectitude which, he asserts, is feared among the ruling
groups in the state: “They do not like a religion which preaches good morality.”
Interestingly, as Hardiman (2003, 267) notes, Govind Giri “was far less critical of the
British than he was of the Rajputs and their henchmen,” something which is also brought
out in the following passage: “We take you to be just and fair.… You are the monarch of
the country.… Do not use force. Have some regard for our feelings. God will bless you.…
You are the guardian saint of our people. You are sensible people.”
In many ways, this echoes the appeals made by insurgent Bhil chieftains in the nine-
teenth century, who would ask that the British intervened against the venality of Rajput
rulers. In other words, despite his references to the restoration of Bhil raj, Govind Giri
does not reject the entire edifice of the state. Rather, as Hardiman argues, he recognises
that “much of what he stood for was in line with the transformation that the British were
trying to bring about in India, and he seems to have been trying to argue that they should
act as his allies and back him and his followers against the local rulers” (cited in Hardiman
2003, 267). This was made even more clear in another appeal, in which he implored the
British authorities to appoint their own chief minister in Sunth state and recruit a military
force from the ranks of his followers; in this way, he argued, him and his disciples would
be ensured of fair treatment (cited in Hardiman 2003, 267).
In other words, even when Bhil resistance turned more adamantly against the sarkar in
the name of Bhil raj, the state was nevertheless seen as a disaggregated entity with which
it was possible to negotiate. And in these negotiations it would be possible to pit higher
echelons against lower echelons by pointing out how the latter, in the way that they abuse
their power and authority, betray the principles of the former. However, in the case of
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Govind Giri’s movement, their expectation that the British would refrain from using force
was belied by the events that unfolded two days after Govind had appealed to “the
guardian saint of the people”: at about eight o’clock in the evening of 16 November,
following orders from the Political Department in Bombay, the troops opened fire at the
Bhils who had gathered on the hill. The firing went on for about two hours; the Bhils
suffered substantial losses, and at the end of the attack some 900 Bhils, along with Govind
Giri himself, were arrested. Govind was subsequently prosecuted and imprisoned.8
In the first half of the 1920s, yet another charismatic leader appeared at the helm of a
Bhil movement that unsettled both Rajput rulers and colonial authorities.9 Motilal Tejawat
was an Oswal Baniya who worked as a munshi (representative) for a firm based in
Udaipur. As part of his job, he used to travel far and wide across Mewar state, and
through his travels he came to know the abuses that the Bhils were subject to at the hands
of Thakurs. After he himself fell foul of the Thakur of Jharol estate and was thrown in jail,
he decided to devote his life to social reform work among the Bhils.
Motilal’s most immediate source of inspiration was the Bijolia movement – a peasant
mobilisation against Thakur dominance that originated in the late nineteenth century and
made significant headway under nationalist leadership from 1915 to the early 1920s. Motilal
came into contact with the movement and its insurgent message through pamphlets that
were being circulated throughout Mewar at the time. The pamphlets denounced Thakur
oppression and called “on villagers to refuse to pay their dues” (Vidal 1997, 122). Motilal
made copies of these pamphlets and set about distributing them in Jharol – a Bhil majority
district where the local Thakur was a source of terror and exploitation. Following this, he
called a series of meeting in Bhil villages in the area, which eventually led to the formation
of a committee that sought to articulate the grievances and demands of the Bhil peasantry.
In May 1921, Motilal and his followers used the annual peasant fair Matri Mundiya,
which was held near Chittaur, to spread their message. Among the key complaints were
begar and unfair taxation. During the fair, the group was able to mobilise a large group of
Bhils, and together they set out for Udaipur; they were going to petition the Maharana and
convince him to address their grievances. Jain’s description of the scenario that unfolded
at Picholia lake is worth quoting at length:
In three or four days, about seven or eight thousand peasants assembled on the site.
Tejawat requested the village representatives to hold [a] small meeting and prepare
accounts of the injustices and atrocities done by the Thikanedars on the peasants.
This was done to prepare a complete catalogue of the grievances of the people at the
grassroot level. At the end of the meeting of each day, in the general meeting, the
peasants expressed their views on the grievances. Tejawat himself sat down to write a
book on the situation of the peasantry of Mewar. Later the book was titled: Mewar
Pukar – the voice of Mewar. The book contained about 100 items. On the strength of
these items the assembly of the peasants prepared a charter of 21 demands to be
presented to the Maharana of Mewar (Jain 1991, 130).
Ultimately, Maharana Fateh Singh agreed to meet the representatives of the gathered
Bhils, who at the peak of the agitation were said to number some 10,000 people.
Among the demands that they put before the regent – 21 in all – the withdrawal of
excessive taxes and fees, the cancellation of begar, and a removal of all restrictions on
the use of forest resources were particularly important to the tribals. Eventually, the
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Maharana conceded 18 demands, but left out the three most important issues from the
point of view of the Bhils: namely the use of forests, begar, and the rounding up of
Bhils for the royal shikhar (hunt). Motilal and his followers withdrew in disappoint-
ment, but swore to uphold and pursue the movement.
In the following months, the movement’s idiom of resistance expanded. Motilal
declared himself to be a follower of Gandhi, whom at this point in time was at the
helm of a nation-wide mobilisation that aimed for “swaraj [self-rule] within a year.”
Drawing inspiration and legitimacy from the Non-Cooperation Movement, Motilal and his
followers began to circulate letters during the summer of 1921, in which they called upon
the peasants to stop paying taxes. Over the next three months, the movement escalated:
… Tejawat told the Bhils that once Gandhi Raj was established they would only have
to pay one anna in the rupee to the state, and that if they refused to follow him they
would be cursed. The boycott of the courts, the refusal to pay the unjustly high rates
of revenue and the denial of rasad (the extraction of provisions) and begar to
functionaries of the state followed (Sen 2007, 160).
In August, the movement signalled its considerable strength when the Thakur of Jharol
had Motilal arrested: as soon as the news spread, between six and seven thousand Bhils
gathered outside the jail and forced the police to release their leader. By September 1921
the movement had spread throughout Mewar as well as many of the other, smaller
princely states in the Rajputana Agency and in British Gujarat in the Bombay
Presidency. At this point, the movement was known as the Eki (Unity) League: its
followers were made to swear an oath whilst holding one hand on an unsheathed
sword, in which they pledged “to respect all the decisions and actions of Motilal, and
never by their actions break the unity of the movement” (Vidal 1997, 127).
The impact of the movement was manifest in a series of complaints brought against the
dominant groups in the region. For example, in December 1921, some 4,000 Gametis
(village headmen) presented a petition to the British authorities on behalf of the Bhils of the
Bhumat and the Magra, in which they claimed “that traditionally they had not performed
begar, but had been forced to do so over the preceding half century, while simultaneously
old taxes had been enhanced and new fines and levies imposed.… The Bhils fixed the
revenue of crops and proposed to pay directly to the British or the darbar” (Sen 2007,
160–161). In a letter to the Rana of the state of Panarwa, a group of Bhils made it clear that
“we intend never to pay new taxes, and what we propose to give is more than the old rates;
if … you will not accept it … and if the [Udaipur] darbar will not accept it, we shall pay to
the British government” (Sen 2007, 161). When, in the same month, a Bhil Gameti was
arrested on the orders of the Umrao of Madri, a small district in the southern part of Mewar,
and later killed in custody, the movement again showed its strength by assembling at Jharol
and forcing the Maharana’s official to refund revenue that had been taken from the Bhils. At
this point, the British started making overtures to the Eki movement: in one case, they sent a
petition prepared by Motilal to the Thakurs and pressured them into announcing that they
would reduce the number of days of begar demanded from the villagers; in another case,
they asked Motilal to meet with the Political Superintendent to discuss the grievances of the
Bhils. These overtures, however, were flatly rejected.
The Eki movement surged ahead in the first months of 1922. At this point, Tejawat had
been denounced by Gandhi but proceeded unabated in his work. For several months he
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and his partisans criss-crossed the area that is now the border between Rajasthan and
Gujarat, and which in the 1920s contained the princely states of Mewar, Sirohi, Danta and
Palanpur: “Wherever the impromptu army halted, Motilal’s camp was visited by tribal
people offering him the traditional homage normally reserved for local chieftains or for
deities: the gift of a coconut and a rupee” (Vidal 1997, 126).
At this point, the initial British strategy of appeasing the Eki movement by encouraging
the princely rulers to grant certain selective concessions had clearly failed. In large part, this
was due to the fact that rulers and notables were generally unwilling to cede any substantial
ground to the assertive Bhils. The Eki movement kept moving between Mewar, Sirohi, Idar,
Danta and Palanpur. While avoiding any direct confrontation with large military troops, they
would attack officials, police outposts and isolated patrols. At this point, as Hardiman
(2007, 51) points out, the colonial authorities “had a choice: either to force the local princes
and thakurs to change their ways profoundly and remedy the grievances of the people, or to
suppress a largely peaceful and morally justified protest by the use of force.”
Under increasing pressure from both local notables and the British to call off their
agitation, the Eki movement decided to return to Udaipur to negotiate with the Maharana.
As Motilal and 2,000 of his followers were making their way to the Sisodia court, orders
were sent from Bombay to the British authorities in the Rajputana Agency “to demand the
unconditional surrender of Moti Lal” and to keep troops ready “to act in support of the
demand when called on by local authorities” (cited in Hardiman 2007, 42). The Mewar
Bhil Corps was thus promptly dispatched to intercept the insurgents before they reached
Udaipur, and on 7 March, near the border between Idar and Mewar, the troops attacked
Motilal and his followers. According to colonial authorities, the attack left 22 Bhils dead,
but there is due reason to doubt this number: “… there were a hundred casualties; dead
and wounded were lying all around,” wrote a local missionary. “Our little hospital was
filled, and we were bringing in stretcher cases until 10 p.m.” (cited in Hardiman 2007,
46). Local Bhils claim the number of dead to have been between 1,200 and 1,500.
The massacre in Sirohi did not put an end to the movement. In the coming months, the
Bhils of several villages in Sirohi state refused to pay their taxes, and the British had to
resort to what they called “the moral effect of the 12 pounder gun” (Vidal 1997, 139) to
break the resolve of the insurrectionary tribals. Eventually, the princely states offered
some concessions in order to restore peace in their realms, and these were accepted by the
Bhils: “They were significant gains, but acceptance also signalled a retreat from the utopia
of an autonomous peasant Raj” (Sen 2007, 166).
The Eki movement shared some of the features of the Bhil uprisings of the nineteenth
century – chief among them, perhaps, “the belief that it was still possible to appeal for
justice to the British, the maharana, and the thikanedars” (Sen 2007, 161). Within the
parameters of this belief, the excesses and predations “of the local authorities were
denounced less as the result of an old order that was naturally oppressive, than as the
outcome of a modern perversion of the system” (Vidal 1997, 126).
What was novel, though, was the mediation of this uprising through Gandhian
idioms: the new kingdom that Motilal would establish was one in which the Bhils
would cast off the yoke of oppression; it was dubbed Gandhi Raj and clearly derived a
significant part of its legitimacy and rationale from a subaltern appropriation of Gandhi’s
message of non-co-operation. Thus, the Eki movement can be said to share some of the
qualities that Singh (1985) found to be typical of the tribal movements that emerged
after 1920: these were movements that saw in the Freedom Movement an opportunity to
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reclaim the rights and prerogatives of a bygone era: “Swaraj to them meant not only
freedom from British rule.… Freedom to them mean restoration of agrarian and forest
rights” (Singh 1985, 161). And this illustrates an important aspect of the contentious
negotiations that the Bhils of western India were involved in during their rebellious
century: rather than the Bhils mobilising a timeless and unchanging culture of resistance
in the face of an ever more entrenched colonial state space, their “repertoire of
contention” evolves over time through the appropriation of idioms from a range of
different state-making projects (see Tilly 2006). Indeed, the Eki movement can be
understood as articulating elements from three state-making projects: pre-colonial
forms of shared sovereignty, the mediation of colonial state space in the princely states,
and finally the nationalist project for an independent Indian state. This again testifies to
the necessity of acknowledging the profoundly relational nature of subaltern politics, not
only in the context of contemporary India, but also across historical time. In the
following concluding remarks, I shall outline how we might make some initial con-
ceptual steps in this direction.
Concluding Remarks
The point of departure for this article was a critique of Chatterjee’s recent contributions to
the study of subaltern politics in contemporary India. My basic contention was that his
argument that the “new subaltern” – to borrow a term from Spivak (2000) – displays an
ability to engage competently and assertively with the state, although correct in and of itself,
is fundamentally inadequate: the unfolding of subaltern politics in and through state–society
relations must be historicised. I then sought to substantiate this claim through a discussion
of Bhil resistance as a form of contentious negotiation of state-making projects across the
century-long period stretching from 1818 to the early 1920s. In these concluding remarks, I
want to move from critique to proposition by sketching an alternative conceptual approach
to the study of the dynamics of state–society relations in subaltern politics.
First of all, it is necessary to conceive of subalternity itself as a determinate position-
ality within a sociohistorical “field-of-force” (Thompson 1978, 151). The socio-historical
field-of-force should in turn be understood as having been moulded through the unfolding
of “hegemonic processes” (Mallon 1995) in which dominant social groups seek to gain
the consent of subaltern social groups through “a continuous process of formation and
superseding of unstable equilibria … between the interests of the fundamental group and
those of the subordinate groups …” (Gramsci 1998, 182). The fact that subaltern groups
thus come to be embedded in socioeconomic relations, political institutions and cultural
idioms that – in spite of concessions and compromises – underpin the reproduction of
hegemony, has ramifications for the oppositional projects they articulate. Subaltern
resistance will tend to proceed through contentious appropriations of “the social conden-
sations of hegemony” (Morton 2007, 92) – that is, through hegemonic political institu-
tions, discourses and processes – rather than at a distance from these.
One of Gramsci’s (1998, 260) great insights was of course that state formation is
integral to the ways in which dominant groups seek “to construct an organic passage from
the other classes into their own” (see also Whitehead 2015). This is significant in relation
to the dynamics of subaltern politics for two reasons. Firstly, it is precisely through the
construction of “organic passages” between dominant and subaltern groups that state
formation as a “master change process” comes to articulate with the “local rationalities”
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that animate subaltern politics (Nilsen and Cox 2013). And therefore, the institutions,
idioms and technologies of rule out of which these passages are constructed also become
“sites of protracted struggle as to what they mean and for whom” (Corrigan and Sayer
1985, 6). Secondly, owing to the fact that the state is congealed from social relations
characterised by “compromise equilibrium” (Gramsci 1998, 161) there will be “conjunc-
tural opportunities” (Jessop 1982, 225) for such struggles to advance the empowerment
and emancipation of subaltern groups. But the compromises that have been struck in and
through the unfolding of hegemonic processes are ones “in which the interests of
dominant groups prevail” (Gramsci 1998, 182) and therefore, such conjunctural opportu-
nities will exist in a dialectical tension with “structural constraints” (Jessop 1982, 225)
that circumscribe the scope for subaltern advances in and through the state and its
institutions, discourses and technologies of rule.
Admittedly, these are only the bare bones of a possible conceptual orientation, and much
work lies ahead if we are to develop a more comprehensive theoretical perspective.
However, within the parameters of this orientation, we are pushed towards a study of
subaltern politics that seeks to grasp the convergence of the contemporary micro-dynamics
of everyday state–society relations and the macro-structural longue durée of state formation.
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Notes
1 The Bhils are one of the major Adivasi groups of western and central India. Consisting of multiple sub-groups
such as Bhilalas, Barelas, and Naiks, the Bhils inhabit the largely hilly regions of northeastern Maharashtra,
eastern Gujarat, southern Rajasthan and western Madhya Pradesh. For the sake of simplicity, I shall use the
term Bhil to refer to Bhils, Bhilalas and Barelas in this paper. I shall refer to the region they inhabit as the Bhil
heartland. The term Adivasi, in turn, literally means “first inhabitant,” and was coined by tribal rights activists
early in the twentieth century to express their claim to being the indigenous people of India. The Indian
government does not recognise Adivasis as being indigenous people, but defines Adivasi communities as
belonging to the category of Scheduled Tribes as per the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Indian constitution.
The Fifth and Sixth Schedules (schedules are basically lists in the Constitution that categorise and tabulate
bureaucratic activity and policy of the Government) provide an array of protective legislation, special
entitlements and reservations for Adivasis.
2 This theme was particularly important in the work of Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, and Sudipta Kaviraj.
See Nilsen (2012) for an extended discussion. In formulating this argument, I also seek to contribute to the
emergence of a new direction in the study of subaltern politics in India (for examples of such work, see, inter
alia, Madhok 2013, Subramanian 2009, Sharma 2009, Chandra 2013, Nielsen 2010 and Agarwala 2013).
3 See Chatterjee (2004) for the original formulation of the civil society/political society distinction and
Gudavarthy (2012) for a comprehensive selection of commentaries on Chatterjee’s proposition. See also
Whitehead (2015) for a substantial criticism of Chatterjee’s distinction between political and civil society.
4 See Chandra (2015) for a useful discussion of the dynamics of negotiation in subaltern resistance.
5 Sibandis were Arab mercenaries who were frequently found in the employ of various rulers throughout
western India in the eighteenth century.
6 In the wake of Briggs’ departure, the British opted for an alternative strategy in Khandesh centred on the
formation of the Khandesh Bhil Corps as a military outfit of Bhil recruits headed by a British officer and the
implementation of more comprehensive efforts to promote sedentary agriculture.
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7 The following account of Govind Giri’s movement draws on Hardiman (2003), Jain (1991) and Singh (1995).
Only direct quotes will be referenced in what follows.
8 There were subsequent attempts to revive the movement and to bring Motilal back into the activist fold, some
of which were carried out by Gandhian nationalists. These efforts, however, failed to come to fruition (see
Hardiman 2003).
9 The following account of Motilal Tejwat’s movement draws on Hardiman (2007), Jain (1991), Sen, (2007),
Singh (1995), and Vidal (1997). Only direct quotes will be referenced in what follows.
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